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The Social Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: A Gramscian Analysis 
 
Dominic Kelly 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I seek to contribute to the post-Fukushima literature on Japan, much of which 
accepts uncritically the orthodox narrative locating Japan’s nuclear origins in the politics of 
the Cold War and in the passivity of Japanese civil society vis-à-vis a ‘strong’ state. In 
contrast, I draw upon Gramsci’s work in order to locate these origins within wider processes 
of global structural transformation associated with the shift from feudalism to capitalism, and 
the attendant imperialism of the nineteenth century. I treat Japan’s Meiji Restoration as an 
instance of passive revolution within this context, one outcome of which was the adoption of 
a specific form of state (the ‘developmental state’) and a specific form of nationalism 
(techno-nationalism). I further argue that the US Occupation of Japan (1945-52) can be 
viewed as another instance of passive revolution. In both cases I examine the economic, 
political and social channels through which state goals were communicated to the Japanese 
populace and either embraced or resisted in turn. I suggest that Japan’s techno-nationalism 
survived into the post-war era, but was stripped of its overt military trappings and portrayed 
instead as a unique combination of ‘pacifism’ and ‘economic developmentalism’. In this way, 
despite being victims of nuclear weapons, ordinary Japanese people were persuaded to 
embrace nuclear power. 
 
Key Words: Gramsci, Japan, United States, Fukushima, Meiji Restoration, techno-
nationalism, passive revolution, integral state, civil society, nuclear power 
 
 
Introduction 
The tragic events of 11 March 2011 in the Tohoku region of Japan have lent momentum to a 
long-standing yet thus far fruitless campaign to rid the country of its reliance on nuclear 
power. In this paper, rather than focussing in detail on the contemporary scene I examine the 
historical roots of Japanese techno-nationalism and the social struggle over the introduction 
of nuclear power to Japan that took place in the early postwar period. My reasoning for this is 
straightforward. First, despite the passage of time, analysis of that earlier struggle may help 
us understand more clearly the character of the contemporary debate and the positions and 
strengths of its major combatants. Second, I contend that the deep roots of Japanese nuclear 
power lie not in the post-war period - upon which most of the existing literature is focussed - 
but in the nineteenth century. Third, much of the contemporary work seeking to explain the 
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impact of the triple disaster - the combined earthquake, tsunami and radiation leak - centred 
upon Fukushima offers a stylised, almost 'ideal-type' portrayal of the relationship between 
state and civil society. In my view, this limits as much as it extends our understanding of the 
contemporary situation in Japan. More broadly, fourth, such an analysis affords an 
opportunity to discuss the theories, concepts and methods appropriate to the study of 
contemporary political science and international relations. 
The argument unfolds in three steps. In the first section I offer a survey of the existing 
(English language) literature on the development of nuclear power, and link this to the 
predominant conceptualisation of the relationship between 'state' and 'civil society' in Japan. 
In the second and third sections, I first introduce an alternative conceptualisation of the 
relationship between state and civil society derived from the work of the political activist and 
scholar Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), before using this in the development of a narrative 
account of techno-nationalism leading to the introduction of nuclear power to Japan. 
 
State, Civil Society & Nuclear Power 
Relatively little has been written in English about the decision to introduce nuclear power to 
Japan. The major text on the development of energy markets, Richard Samuels' The Business 
of the Japanese State (1987), contains less than twenty pages on the subject.1 Moreover, 
Samuels bases his argument on a rather restrictive notion of what constitutes the 'politics of 
reciprocal consent': focussing almost exclusively on the tight relationship forged between the 
Japanese state (represented chiefly as the bureaucracy, supported by a supine government - 
the Liberal Democratic Party) and private business interests (the power generation 
companies). In his depiction, there is little or no role for an active civil society in the politics 
of energy provision. 
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In the case of nuclear power, Samuels has been criticised for over-emphasising the 
conflictual side of the relationship between the Japanese state, as he conceives it, and private 
business interests. In contrast, and with a focus on the post-Chernobyl (1986) period, 
Dauvergne (1993) argues that for the most part the government was content to play a 
jurisdictional role (setting state subsidies for power generation, providing economic 
guarantees and safety nets) whilst allowing private business to exercise authority over the 
development process and day-to-day running of the industry. Dauvergne further argues that 
Samuel's underplays the role of 'outside forces' in the unfolding development of the nuclear 
power generation industry. By 'outside forces' Dauvergne is referring to civil society: sections 
of the media outside the government-influenced 'reporters clubs' and other concerned 
Japanese citizens protesting locally and on a regional and national basis.2 Despite his 
assessment that civil society has been more important since the mid-1990s, Dauvergne 
echoes Samuels' formal demarcation between state ('inside') and civil society ('outside'). This 
division appears again in Aldrich's work on the siting of controversial facilities such as 
nuclear power plants in Japan3.  
Since '3.11' (as the triple disaster has become known in Japan), a body of work has 
emerged seeking to explain both its immediate impact on and long-term consequences for 
Japanese society. Most of the arguments advanced in this literature continue to echo Samuels, 
Dauvergne and Aldrich in their acceptance of a separation between the state (elite 
bureaucrats, conservative politicians, big business) and civil society.4 Kawato et al (2012, 
78), typify acceptance of this separation when they 'understand civil society to be the 
organized non-state, non-market sector that exists above the family and individual'.  This 
definition and those like it are products of liberal thinking where 'civil society' describes a 
space beyond the control of the state carved out by organised groups of citizens anxious to 
both monitor and limit the exercise of state authority.5  Conceptualising the relationship 
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between 'state' and 'civil society' in this way is the norm amongst scholars of Japanese society 
(Schwartz and Pharr 2003; Pekkanen 2006; Avenell 2010; Hasegawa 2014), as is the view 
that civil society has been ‘weak’ in Japan relative to the bureaucracy and big business.6 
Discussions of the 'nuclear village' - defined by Kingston (2013, 201) as 'pro-nuclear 
advocates, including utilities, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, and experts' - tend to be 
less explicit in their claims but suggest, nevertheless, that there is a border or separation 
between policy makers and policy takers on nuclear and (by extension) other issues.7  As 
separate entities, the interests of these groups are most often seen to 'clash' at the intersection 
of pro- and anti-nuclear policies. The broad outcome of this clash of interests has been 
victory for the 'nuclear village' over the concerned citizen, although since the 1970s it has 
become more difficult for the former to triumph in individual struggles over siting issues in 
particular (Broadbent 1998; Lesbirel 1998; Aldrich 2008). 
One theme evident in the post-Fukushima literature is cautious optimism that the 
power of the nuclear village will wane and that of civil society wax as Japan considers a non-
nuclear future.8 This optimism is based upon a number of factors. The first factor is the 
upsurge in anti-nuclear activism and sentiment seen in Japan since the disaster. This upsurge 
is closely linked to questions of legitimacy and democratisation since it includes a reaction to 
both the woefully slow and inadequate government response to the explosion and radiation 
leak at the Fukushima plant, and to the efforts of the private company concerned - Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) - to obscure its culpability in the matter. The second 
factor is the groundswell of support for the people of the Tohoku region emerging from all 
over Japan, and in particular to the phenomenon of volunteerism which has seen many 
thousands of people travelling to the region to offer assistance. This second factor is also tied 
into wider currents in Japanese society given that the volunteerism sparked by the triple 
disaster - and the organisational structures in place through which it is channelled - appears 
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much more robust because of lessons learned from the earlier experience of the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that struck the Kobe-Osaka region in 1995. That experience, and 
the alteration to the Civil Code through the Law for the Promotion of Specified Non-Profit 
Activities (commonly known as the NPO Law) that followed in 1998, are seen as marking a 
'watershed' (Schwartz 2003, 14-19) in the evolution of civil society in Japan.9 In essence, 
those hoping for a re-balancing of the relationship between state, big business and civil 
society in Japan see in the ongoing response to the triple disaster a light at the end of the 
tunnel. Increased civic engagement, if it can be sustained, is seen as an important milestone 
on the road to Japan becoming not only nuclear-free but also a fully-fledged and mature 
democracy.   
I am less optimistic. Notwithstanding the potential significance of both the upsurge in 
anti-nuclear sentiment and the growth of civic activism since the triple disaster, the power of 
the 'nuclear village' is deeply entrenched within Japanese society and will be extremely 
difficult to uproot (Oguma 2016). Indeed, a neo-nationalist backlash took place very soon 
after the triple disaster, as exemplified by the election and subsequent actions of Abe Shinzo 
as Prime Minister (Kingston 2016). This backlash sits within a wider context of a shift to the 
political right in Japan over the past several decades (Nakano 2016), and one of its outcomes 
has been the abandonment of the ‘zero option’ for nuclear power touted soon after the triple 
disaster, and its replacement by official support for maintaining nuclear power as a 
significant (20-22%) part of Japan’s energy mix over the long term (METI 2015, 8). 
My assessment results not from the understanding that an 'outside' force (civil society) 
lacks the strength to dislodge an 'inside' force (the state / nuclear village). Rather, my view is 
that it is not possible to separate these two 'forces' at all since they are co-constituted. I 
therefore agree with Joseph Buttigieg's (2005, 36-7) argument, derived from a Gramscian 
understanding of the nature of civil society, that 'the conflating of civil society ... with 
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popular oppositional movements results in an oversimplification of the immensely intricate, 
interdependent relations between society (or "the people") and government (or the state), and 
in a reductive understanding of the myriad connections and divergences among the various 
elements that constitute civil society.’10 This oversimplification, he goes on to suggest, 'gives 
rise to politically debilitating misdiagnoses of the operations of power and of the resilience of 
the very forces one presumably wants to combat.'  
In this paper, I want to avoid a 'reductive understanding' of civil society by 
emphasising three elements that are sometimes (although rarely simultaneously) considered 
but usually underplayed in other work on Japanese civil society and the evolution of the 
Japanese nuclear power industry.11 These three elements are: firstly, the internal relations of 
Japanese civil society and the Japanese state; secondly, the place and role of nuclear power in 
Japanese techno-nationalism; and thirdly, the dual role of nuclear power. Inclusion of the first 
element avoids the mistake of reifying arbitrary boundaries between nominally separate 
social groups. Insertion of the second element builds on material and institutional 
conceptualisations of power relationships. Addition of the third element both enables an 
analysis of the key role played in the introduction of nuclear power to Japan by its former 
conqueror and chief ally, the US, and extends the empirical account into the politics of Cold 
War rearmament.12 
I consider these three elements within the broad frame provided by an historical 
account examining, firstly, the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Japan and, secondly, 
the politics of the early postwar period (1945-1960). With a particular emphasis on the co-
constitution of and symbiotic relationship between state and civil society, this account maps 
out the configuration of social forces that fostered the creation of a "collective will" in 
Japanese society towards the adoption of nuclear power around and through a narrative of 
techno-nationalism. Samuels (1994, x) defines techno-nationalism as 'the belief that 
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technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, 
diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong'. In contrast, and with his 
gaze firmly fixed on the postwar period, Low (2003, 197) defines techno-nationalism as 'a 
common commitment to economic growth fuelled by science and technology'.13 
On a foundation provided by the historical materialism of Antonio Gramsci, I suggest 
that techno-nationalism found expression first in Japanese nationalism and imperialism 
(1894-1945) before being consciously repackaged in the postwar era as the pursuit of 
economic growth and pacifism. I argue that the successful repackaging of techno-nationalism 
played a major role in overcoming hostility towards nuclear power in Japanese society: 
enabling the establishment of a nuclear industry in the early 1950s in addition to the signing 
of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. This explanation runs counter to the 
standard line in the literature suggesting that it was possible to introduce nuclear power into 
Japan because civil society was 'weak' relative to the state. On the contrary, it became 
possible to develop a nuclear industry in Japan only after a prolonged struggle for hegemony 
conducted upon the terrain of civil society: a struggle won in part through reference to the 
narrative of techno-nationalism laid down from the Meiji era onwards. The majority of the 
paper is given over to the case study. In the next section, however, I establish what I think are 
the merits of a Gramscian analysis in this case. 
 
Gramsci's Historical Materialism 
As part of his analysis of the unification of Italy in 1870 and the rise of fascism in that 
country in the 1920s, Gramsci reflected on the deployment of ideology - 'the terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle' (Gramsci: 1971, 377) - as a 
means through which political and economic structures and processes could be organised and 
controlled. In so doing, and in common with other Western Marxists, he tried to understand 
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more fully the relationship between the forces of production (the base) and the relations of 
production (the superstructure).14 
Gramsci's work as a journalist and cultural critic, as well as his (unfinished) university 
education in linguistics, undoubtedly fed this determination to focus on the relations of 
production in civil society: the realm of ideas, of the arts, culture, myth and religion.15 His 
focus is also the result, however, of a diagnosis regarding the failure of the revolution to 
appear in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, as anticipated by classical and 
orthodox Marxists, and its appearance instead in relatively 'backward' Russia. Based 
primarily upon his own direct observations of currents within Italian society (conditions 
within the agrarian South of Italy contrasted with those in the industrialising North; the rise 
of fascism) and on the experience gained whilst attempting to create and steer the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), Gramsci's diagnosis (1971: 229-39) was the following. Social 
revolution took place in Russia rather than in the advanced capitalist countries of the West 
because the former lacked an essential ingredient possessed by the latter: a 'powerful system 
of fortresses and earthworks' (that is, a robust civil society) upon and behind which, in his 
view, state power ultimately rests. In such circumstances, a 'war of movement' (direct 
confrontation) would not succeed in bringing about revolutionary change in the west. 
This diagnosis prompted Gramsci to seek a means through which the grip of the 
northern industrialists and southern landowners on Italy might be broken, and a communist 
society established. According to him, the mechanism through which that task might be 
achieved was the revolutionary party: an organisation he saw as a modern equivalent of 
Machiavelli's 'Prince'.16  Through a painstaking process of political education, Gramsci 
envisaged the creation of a mass movement and its mobilisation towards revolutionary 
change. The movement was to be rooted both in the industrial working class of northern Italy 
(beginning in Turin with the factory council movement) and in the agrarian poor of southern 
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Italy, led and directed by the PCI. This process he called a 'war of position': political struggle 
aimed at identifying, understanding and overcoming the structures and organisations (mental 
and physical) conferring privilege and power on the Italian ruling class. In contrast to the 'war 
of movement', the war of position was an exercise in the production of consent to rule and 
was to be conducted not directly against the state but in and through civil society. The 
'system of fortresses and earthworks' was not to be battered down from outside, but was to be 
dismantled and rebuilt from within. 
Civil society was thus central to Gramsci's thought and praxis (Buci-Glucksmann 
1980). In contrast to the liberal conception dominant in scholarship on Japan, civil society 
and political society (the formal machinery of the state) are inseparable, and are 
distinguished by Gramsci only for heuristic purposes.17 The dialectical unity of the moments 
of civil society and political society is captured in the concept of the 'integral state': perhaps 
'Gramsci's novel contribution to Marxist political theory' (Thomas 2009, 137). The hegemony 
of one social class over all others is guaranteed by its monopolisation of legitimate violence 
(that is, control of the machinery of state) but secured through struggle on the terrain of civil 
society. In Gramsci's (1971, 57-8) own words, 'the state is the entire complex of practical and 
theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules'.    
History tells us that the efforts of Gramsci and those others with whom he 
collaborated were in vain. Italian fascism was defeated not from within but from without, and 
through a 'war of movement' that established not a communist society but an approximation 
of a liberal democratic society. By then, Gramsci himself was dead, many of his collaborators 
were either in prison or had fled, and the movement itself had been largely co-opted by 
fascism. 
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Despite Gramsci's political failure, his intellectual legacy remains. It is my contention 
that this legacy can help us understand more fully the remarkable decision taken by the 
Japanese government to adopt and develop nuclear power in their earthquake and tidal wave 
prone country only a few years after having been attacked to devastating effect by this same 
technology in its original, weaponised form. It can also, therefore, help us to appreciate more 
fully the constraints and opportunities faced by those in Japan (and elsewhere) struggling to 
rid their society of this controversial and dangerous technology. 
The attraction of Gramsci's work lies broadly in its commitment to and further 
development of historical materialism, and in the conceptual armamentarium Gramsci 
developed for that purpose. In this specific case, its appeal lies in the contrast between the 
standard liberal-democratic interpretations of state and civil society (as separate entities with 
both shared and competing interests) underpinning contemporary analyses of the debate over 
the future of nuclear power in Japan, and Gramsci's understanding that state and civil society 
are not things in and of themselves but historically rooted, mutually constituted, ever-
changing relationships of power. Charting historically the evolution of these relationships of 
power facilitates an analysis that avoids what Buttigieg (2005, 36-7) calls 'politically 
debilitating misdiagnoses of the operations of power and of the resilience of the very forces 
one presumably wants to combat.' In short, Gramsci's work can help us identify and 
understand the mental and physical structures and institutions conferring power and privilege 
on the Japanese ruling class.  
 
Imperialism, Techno-Nationalism and the Integral State 
According to Okimoto (1989, 21-2), one of the key forces shaping Japanese industrial policy 
between the mid-nineteenth century and the late 1970s was the desire 'to industrialize as fast 
as possible in order to catch up with and overtake the leading powers of the West'. Similarly, 
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Curtis (1999, 39) identifies a 'pervasive public consensus in support of policies to achieve the 
catch-up-with-the-West goal' as one of four 'crucial pillars' supporting the 1955 system in 
Japan.18 It is this policy of industrial catch-up, and the manner in which its necessity was 
inculcated within the hearts and minds of ordinary Japanese people, that we must first explain 
if we are to understand more fully the decision to adopt nuclear power taken in the 1950s. 
In the mid-nineteenth century Japan was a semi-feudal society divided into roughly 
250 semi-autonomous fiefs under the dominion of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Tokugawa 
ruled in the name of the emperor who was himself, according to Japan's creation myth, a 
descendant of the gods and their representative on earth. Japanese society was, in short, a 
caste-based hierarchy ordered vertically by myth and tradition and horizontally by political 
expediency. The Tokugawa had consolidated their power, from 1603, through de-centralised 
control over the lesser fiefs, isolation from the outside world, and ossification of the caste 
system (samurai, peasants, artisans, merchants). Drawing upon Confucian roots, the ideology 
of the status system demanded individual service and subordination to the collective (Hall 
1974). Japan became a 'family-nation', and the emperor its politically impotent father figure 
(Gluck 1985).   
Ultimately, however, the Tokugawa could not stifle the emergence of socio-economic 
forces that would lead to calls for change from the leaders of rival fiefs and from youthful 
elements of the ruling samurai caste (Hanley and Yamamura, 1977). 'Outside' fiefs, located 
far from Tokyo, the seat of Tokugawa power, were sensitive to developments on the Asian 
mainland and the wider world. They perceived the growing power and technological 
sophistication of the western powers, and grew fearful for Japan as China was first defeated 
in the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1857-60) and then divided into spheres of influence through 
the imposition of what became known as the 'unequal treaties' (Auslin 2006). These fiefs 
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covertly imported modern weapons and technology, and also developed indigenous 
technology and methods of production (Hacker 1977; Totman 1980; Morris-Suzuki 1994). 
Over many years, economic power in Japan had slipped away from the samurai and 
fallen instead into the hands of an emergent merchant class (Sheldon 1958). This led to the 
impoverishment of many low-ranking samurai, the further immiseration of large sections of 
the peasantry, and the rise of resentment and protest in Tokugawa society (Borton 1968; Bix 
1986; Vlastos 1995). Particularly significant was the resentment felt by many younger - 
underemployed and impoverished yet well-educated - samurai who could not hope to 
advance far within their existing clan hierarchies (Smith, 1961; Hirschmeier 1964). It was 
from amongst the ranks of these 'men of talent' that calls for change emerged first and 
loudest. Some of these men would go on to lead Japan following the Meiji Restoration of 
1868 (Silbermann 1993). 
The arrival of Commodore Perry's 'Black Ships' in 1853 signalled the beginning of the 
end of Tokugawa rule (Walworth, 1966). Hopelessly outmatched by western technology and 
power, Japan had signed treaties of 'amity and commerce' with the Americans, British, 
Russians, Prussians, Dutch and French by 1861. By 1868 the Tokugawa had been overthrown 
and the Emperor Meiji (a youth aged 16 years) restored - in name at least - to his position as 
head of state (Beasley 1973, 1990). Within a relatively few years the formal caste system had 
been abolished, the feudal landholding system swept aside, a comprehensive land survey 
conducted, a land tax instituted, a system of compulsory education instated, and a conscript 
army raised. A modern machinery of government emerged in fits and starts, and a 
Constitution was gifted to his subjects by the emperor in February 1889. In sum, roughly 
thirty years after the Meiji Restoration the institutional and regulatory foundations of a 
modern state had been laid down (Silberman 1993). 
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The exhilarating pace and thoroughgoing nature of the Meiji Restoration has been 
captured many times in both the academic literature and wider media. What also comes 
through in the literature, however, is the notion that the 'restoration' of imperial rule was an 
elite-driven process featuring little input from ordinary Japanese people. To cite just three 
examples here, Hobsbawm (1975, 151) suggests that 'the initiative, the direction and the 
cadres of the '"revolution from above" came from sections of the feudalists themselves.' 
Stockwin (1999, 15) argues that the Meiji Restoration 'was a revolution carried out by 
dissident elements of the old ruling class: a revolution from above, not below'. Similarly, 
Gordon (2014, 61-75) frames the process as a 'samurai revolution' conducted on elite 
samurai terms and in elite samurai interests - with the latter portrayed as synonymous with 
the 'national' interest. Gramsci (1971, 59) encapsulates such moments of '"revolution" 
without a "revolution" through his concept of 'passive revolution': indicating, in this case, a 
political strategy through which a small group of individuals institute incremental yet far 
reaching change in society (Gramsci 1971, 106-20; Showstack Sassoon 1982; Allinson and 
Anievas 2010; Morton 2010). 
A particular interpretation of this elite-driven explanation underpins the liberal 
argument that civil society (understood, as noted earlier, as 'the organized non-state, non-
market sector that exists above the family and individual') in Japan has been weak and 
underdeveloped throughout the modern era. In the liberal view, aside from a temporary 
flourishing during the time of 'Taisho democracy' (roughly, 1918-31), and again in the early 
post-war period (1945-60), elites have for the most part managed to restrain civil society 
through a variety of administrative, coercive and co-optive means. The suggestion is that civil 
society in Japan is too 'small', that it operates at too local a level, and therefore lacks national 
coherence and direction. In Japan, it is 'hard for autonomous groups to become large, and 
hard for large groups to be autonomous' (Pekkanen: 2003, 133). In this reading, Japanese 
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civil society is ill-equipped to perform adequately its primary function: monitoring the state 
and holding it to account through the exercise of public opinion and use of the ballot box. 
Nevertheless, according to the standard narrative, from the 1970s onwards, beginning 
with protests over the environmental destruction being wrought upon the archipelago by 
rapid industrialisation (Broadbent 1998; Walker 2010), civil society began to stir. From this 
platform, civil society was kept energised by a series of public failures and scandals 
(including political and bureaucratic corruption; economic mismanagement; and issues of 
environmental and public health) through the 1980s and 1990s.19 Popular disgust with the 
government's response to the Kobe-Osaka earthquake and, latterly, the events of ‘3.11’, 
appears to be fuelling the liberal hope that the dam behind which the pent-up energies of 
Japanese civil society have been contained for so long is beginning to crumble. 
I suggest an interpretation at odds with the liberal norm. Understood in Gramscian 
terms as a passive revolution, the Meiji Restoration (and, as we shall see, the US Occupation 
of Japan) was indeed an elite-driven process, but those elites secured their hegemony by 
working extremely hard to mould (Garon 1997) the energies of a robust, vibrant and 
politically engaged civil society. Many Japanese people were eager to realise the possibility 
afforded by the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji of the further democratisation of society, 
whilst cognisant of the limitations on public action imposed by existing social structures.20 
Thus, 'public actors remonstrated with bad officials without rejecting officaldom' and 'they 
reconceived authority in accord with the still-elitist principle of expert performance' (Berry: 
1998, 156). In short, 'actors in Japan's public sphere presumed a vital membership in the 
polity without presuming control over it' (Berry: 1998, 139). The lines of force ran both 
ways, nevertheless, as 'many of the new social forces entered into rather intimate relations 
with the state' (Garon 2003: 56).  
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Recall that for Gramsci state and civil society are, in concrete terms, inseparable. 
Thus, there is no 'dam' behind which pent-up energies are contained. Rather, the Meiji state 
actively channeled the energies of Japanese subjects in directions suited to its needs. The two 
primary channels were economic modernisation and imperialism. These channels were 
forged partly through ideological clarion calls to 'revere the emperor, expel the barbarians' 
heard following the signing of the unequal treaties, and to pursue 'civilisation and 
enlightenment' in order to build Japan into a 'rich nation, strong army' issued during the Meiji 
era.21 The river into which these channels jointly spilled was techno-nationalism: manifest at 
the time through the pursuit of rapid industrialisation underpinned by social control and 
scientific and technological advancement (Gao 1997; Low 2005). 
The concept of hegemony is crucial to understanding how Gramsci envisaged the 
shifting nature and character of relations between state and civil society.  In his own (1971: 
80) words, 'the "normal" exercise of hegemony ... is characterised by the combination of 
force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating 
excessively over consent.' In other words, hegemony involves the use of both coercion and 
persuasion in the interests of the ruling class, but with the emphasis on the latter where 
possible (see, amongst others, Mouffe 1979). These interests are 'naturalised' in the minds of 
members of subordinate classes via an appropriate ideology (in this case, techno-
nationalism), while dissent is smothered through compromise or force. The pursuit of 
hegemony involves the struggle for control over the machinery of the state; a struggle that 
begins in civil society. It is, however, an unending struggle: hegemony is never 'complete' but 
is always contested and challenged and therefore must be perpetually defended and 
reinforced. 
In shaping the socio-political and economic transformation of Japan during the Meiji 
era, elite samurai already controlled the machinery of state power. This is why the Meiji 
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Restoration can be characterised in Gramscian terms as an instance of passive revolution. In 
the context of western imperialism, the task before the Meiji leadership was to restructure the 
machinery of the state to suit their purposes whilst at the same time producing Japanese 
subjects supportive of their goals. As Mouffe (1979, 182) puts it: the 'objective of ideological 
struggle is not to reject the system and all its elements but to rearticulate it, to break it down 
to its constituent elements and then to sift through past conceptions to see which ones, with 
some changes of content, can serve to express the new situation.' 
Upon a foundation provided by a national taxation system, the government developed 
a specific set of institutions and constructed and framed the interests of Japanese subjects 
through ideological appeals grounded in techno-nationalism. The search for the resources and 
markets needed to sustain techno-nationalism, as well as a desire both to compete against and 
secure recognition from the western imperial powers led ineluctably to imperialism (Iriye 
1989). The state: 
sought to bind the "public" to itself along with the authority to define the identity 
and values of its subjects. The centripetal force of this identification was most 
evident amongst bureaucrats, where personal, official, and national identity were 
intertwined with a powerful sense of mission - to civilize the people, to acquire 
learning for the sake of the nation, to raise Japan's status in the world (Barshay: 
2003b, 8). 
The key move was both to elevate the emperor to the pinnacle of Japanese society, 
and to isolate him from the vicissitudes of day-to-day politics (Titus 1974). This was 
achieved in a number of ways, the most important of which was the promulgation of the 
Constitution of 1889: Article 3 of which reads 'The Emperor is sacred and inviolable'. 
Articles 1-16 deal with all aspects of the emperor's role, empowering him with authority over 
the newly constituted Imperial Diet and over the bureaucracy, and granting him supreme 
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command over the army and navy. The Constitution also granted an unelected Privy Council 
authority to 'deliberate on important matters of State' (Article 56) and to advise the emperor 
accordingly at his discretion. A House of Peers was created, and was composed of members 
of the imperial family, of the nobility, and of others nominated by the emperor. This House of 
Peers counter-balanced the power of the elected House of Representatives.22 A separate 
section of the Constitution established the rights and obligations of Japanese subjects - with 
some 'rights' constrained 'within limits not prejudicial to peace and order' (Article 28 on 
freedom of religious belief) and 'within the limits of the law' (Article 29 on freedom of 
speech and association).23 
As Gordon (2014, 83) notes, the Constitution, while in part a response to very real 
pressure from large sections of Japanese society for democratisation, was for the most part a 
tool of social control. The 'Meiji leaders were not simply caving in to the opposition. They 
had already decided that constitutional government was needed to secure international respect 
for Japan and to mobilize the energies of the people behind projects to build a "rich nation 
and strong army"'.  The document 'was written and presented in a way that sought to 
maximize the power of the state and minimize that of the people' (Gordon: 2014, 91). 
Through the mechanism of the Constitution, control over the country remained firmly in the 
hands of a (former) samurai elite and their allied landlords, merchants, industrialists and 
financiers in both the cities and the countryside. 
State power was also entrenched within and extended by the bureaucratic structure.24 
The Home Ministry set about streamlining the local government system through forced 
consolidation of hamlets into a far smaller number of villages; and did the same to Shinto 
shrines. With smaller numbers, it was believed, would come greater central control. By 1871 
Shinto shrines had been formally designated 'government institutions for the observance of 
"national rites"' (Gordon: 2014, 108). The Home Ministry also either directly created or 
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indirectly encouraged the development of a large number of associations and societies, 
including the Ladies' Patriotic Association in 1901 and the Local Improvement Campaign in 
1908 (Pyle 1973; see also Garon 1993, 1997 and 2003). Under the leadership of Mori 
Arinori, moreover, the Ministry of Education continued a trend begun in the 1870s to use the 
education system as a tool of social control. The Ministry introduced military-style teacher 
training and exerted greater editorial control over the content of school textbooks: so that 
both inculcated within the classroom Confucian ideals of obedience, filial piety and loyalty to 
the state. In 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education, which in later years 'took on a sacred 
aura of remarkable power' (Gordon: 2014, 104), formally reinforced these objectives: urging 
Japanese subjects to '... advance public good and promote common interests; always respect 
the Constitution and observe the law; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously 
to the state' (cited in Beasley: 1990, 96; and Gordon: 2014, 104). 
Finally, military conscription was started in January 1873. From the age of twenty, 
men were to serve for a period of three years, followed by four years in the military reserve. 
As with the education system, conscription served a dual purpose. On one hand it was a 
means towards a modern, standing army. On the other it served to expose conscripts to 
nationalist ideas that would return with them to their villages and homes. This latter purpose 
was further advanced by the creation in 1910 of the Imperial Military Reserve Association, 
an organisation that had branches in almost every village in the country by 1918 (Smethurst 
1974; Gordon: 2014, 135). 
The results of Japan's rapid transformation during the Meiji era are well known, and I 
will therefore only briefly touch on them here. In short, then, Japan's leaders got what they 
wanted: a highly ordered, economically productive society, and western recognition as a 
modern, centralised, economically dynamic and, above all, militarily powerful state able to 
compete with the imperial powers on a roughly equal basis. Unfortunately, Japan's leaders 
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were also on the receiving end of two things they certainly did not want: an economic crisis, 
and a related political crisis.25 
The global economic crisis that followed the Wall Street crash in 1929 impacted 
heavily upon the Japanese economy. Unemployment skyrocketed as thousands of small and 
medium sized enterprises went to the wall. Land disputes between tenant farmers and their 
landlords also increased exponentially as the latter sought direct control over their assets, and 
the ability to offer work to unemployed relatives returning from the cities. Meanwhile, 
cynical manipulation of the currency markets by the zaibatsu banks led to protests decrying 
the perceived self-serving cronyism of big capital and the established political parties. 
Throughout the 1920s it seemed, farmers, shopkeepers, factory workers and students were 
protesting at one time or another, and often at the same time. In addition, in what Gordon 
(2014, 166) calls 'government by assassination', a wave of politically motivated murders 
swept the land coming to a peak in the 1930s. Coupled with increasingly aggressive moves 
undertaken independently by the army in Japan's colonies, fear of social disorder, possibly 
ending in a communist-inspired revolution, resulted in a steady increase in authoritarian 
measures taken by the state, and in a concomitant narrowing of civil liberties. Meanwhile, 
public confidence in political parties, and in the Diet itself, ebbed away, leaving the 
bureaucracy and the military to engage increasingly in inter- and intra-factional struggles 
over the reins of state power (Storry 1957). 
In addition to the sense of crisis emerging from socio-economic upheaval, Japan's 
leaders also discerned a weakening of their strategic position - particularly in Manchuria - as 
a consequence of a resurgence of Chinese nationalism under the leadership of Chiang Kai 
Shek and a strengthened Soviet military presence in the Far East. Meanwhile, Japan's larger 
imperial ambitions appeared threatened by British and American determination to limit the 
size of the Japanese navy relative to their own. These developments at home and abroad 
20 
occasioned efforts to bring the economy, the polity, and Japanese society under more 
centralised control (Berger 1989). Increasingly isolated, Japan moved inexorably into the 
'dark valley' of ultra-nationalism and the Pacific War. With a great deal of popular support, 
the military slowly took control: expanding its reach still further into the economy and 
society in order to finance and deliver expansion abroad. 
 
Techno-Nationalism and Nuclear Power 
The atomic bombing of Japan, on 6 and 9 August, 1945, ended Japan's imperial ambitions. 
Japan was formally occupied by the United States until 1952 (1972 in Okinawa and the 
Ryukyu Islands), and its pre-war economy and institutions subjected to a process of de-
concentration and democratisation (Fukui 1989; Dower 1993 and 1999; Gordon 2014). Most 
importantly, the new Constitution preserved the emperor as the symbolic head of state and in 
so doing ensured a degree of real and cognitive continuity with the past. Nevertheless, 
sovereignty now resided in the Japanese people, and the cabinet answered to the Diet rather 
than to the emperor. Human rights, civil rights and the autonomy of the judiciary were 
protected in law. The now infamous 'peace clause' (Article 9 of the Constitution) required 
Japan to renounce both war and the maintenance of a military in perpetuity. The 
emancipation of women, land reform, and the reform of industrial relations went hand in 
hand with the Tokyo War Crimes trials, a purge of 'ultra-nationalists' (impacting most heavily 
upon the military and conservative politicians), bureaucratic reform, reform of the police and 
local bureaucracy, and the forced breakup of the zaibatsu combines. 
The vicissitudes of the Cold War softened American attitudes toward the twin 
objectives of the Occupation. In place of de-concentration and democratisation, economic 
rehabilitation and political stabilisation came into focus. This provided the opportunity for 
'enduring features of political and economic life' (Gordon: 2014, 241) in pre-war Japan to 
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survive in fresh yet familiar guises. These enduring features were the zaibatsu / keiretsu, 
conservative politicians and their political parties, and the civilian bureaucracy. With the 
formation of the Liberal Democratic Party under the leadership of Kishi Nobusuke (a highly 
corrupt, deeply reactionary individual who had played a key role in administering Japanese 
imperialism), the last pillar of the '1955 system' identified by Curtis (1999, 39) was cemented 
in place. 
Meanwhile, following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 Japan was effectively 
rearmed, and the country has acted as a staging post for the execution of US foreign policy 
ever since (Swenson-Wright 2005; McCormack 2007; Muto 2013). US basing rights were, 
however, traded in exchange for an early end to the Occupation, the partial return of 
sovereignty, and a security guarantee that allowed Japan to focus on economic reconstruction 
rather than divert scarce resources into military production (Dower 1979). The presence of 
US bases on Japanese soil implicitly promised the countries of Asia that Japanese 
imperialism was a thing of the past. Nevertheless, the US-Japan alliance, enshrined in the 
peace and security treaties, allowed a close association to be drawn between the 'widely 
accepted fiction' (Samuels: 2003, 211) of formal Japanese pacifism and the reality of 
participation in the Cold War conflict. 
Japan's participation in the Cold War became one of the most divisive issues in its 
post-war domestic politics. Polling in metropolitan Tokyo during 1960 indicated that a large 
majority of respondents thought peace should be the most important goal of the nation 
(Fukui: 1989, 207). Had they known that their Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke, had reached 
a secret agreement with the US allowing the latter to introduce nuclear weapons onto 
Japanese soil, it is very likely that their response would have been even more emphatic.26 The 
revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in January 1960 and its ratification by Japan's 
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national Diet later in that year accordingly brought hundreds of thousands of protestors out 
into the streets (Packard 1966; Gordon: 2014, 273-5). 
It was within this broad context that the debate over nuclear power took place.27 
Whilst largely accepting of the prospect of the development of commercial nuclear power, 
the Japanese public was hostile to nuclear weapons. This hostility increased exponentially 
after Japan fell victim to its ‘third nuclear attack’ – the Castle Bravo test of 1 March 1954 
(Akiyama 2003; Yamazaki 2009). The Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon), a Japanese fishing 
vessel, was caught in the radioactive fallout and by the time it returned to Japan on 14 March 
most of the crew were suffering from radiation exposure. As a consequence of this incident, 
many local governments passed resolutions calling for a ban on all military use of nuclear 
energy. Both Houses of the national Diet followed suit. Meanwhile, a group of Tokyo 
housewives started an anti-nuclear weapons petition that received 18 million signatures in 
only a few months. The national petition that followed garnered around 32 million signatures: 
more than half of Japan’s registered voters (Hook 1996: 171; Akiyama 2003: 73; Yamazaki 
2009: 141). Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki’s International Cultural Hall 
attracted more than 330,000 visitors between them in 1955, and Hiroshima hosted the First 
World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The Japan Council Against 
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) was formed in September 1955, and would 
subsequently become one of Japan’s most important mass movements (Wittner 1997: 9). 
Clearly the state had a fight on its hands if it was to pursue its dream of a bright future 
for Japan fuelled in part by nuclear power. The response, headed by ‘veto players’ (Hyams 
2011) like Nakasone Yasuhiro and Shoriki Matsutaro, was to use both traditional channels of 
influence (money, legislation, administrative structures and bureaucratic guidance) and novel 
channels to sway Japanese public opinion. Thus Nakasone campaigned constantly in favour 
of nuclear power, and used his position in various government posts (including as Prime 
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Minister) to bring this goal to fruition. Similarly, Shoriki used his media empire (the Yomiuri 
newspaper and, later, television) to persuade a skeptical Japanese public just how much better 
their lives would be in a nuclear future. Nakasone and Shoriki were far from alone.  
Successive Japanese governments, politicians of the left and right, scientists, and Japanese 
business and media interests consistently championed the development of a civilian-
controlled, commercial nuclear industry (Yanaga 1968: Chapter 7; Samuels 1987: Chapter 6; 
Hein 1990: 281-4; Hyams 2011). 
Lured by visions of future prosperity and a lifestyle of leisure, the Japanese populace 
began to succumb. The final inducement was the arrival in Japan of the ‘Atom’s for Peace’ 
exhibition: a US propaganda initiative originally designed to sway its own citizens in favour 
of nuclear technology. Partly sponsored by Shoriki through the Yomiuri, the exhibition toured 
Japan in 1956 and was a great success. Children admired the artists’ impressions of nuclear 
powered vehicles. Women were captivated by the fashionably dressed exhibition guides, and 
by the labour-saving potential of the new household devices on display (Zwigenberg 2012). 
Scientists were bowled over by the application of nuclear power in a wide range of fields. In 
this way, nuclear power became both a symbol of and a contributor towards Japan’s post-war 
techno-nationalist destiny. 
 
Conclusion 
The origins of nuclear power in Japan lie in what Johnson (1982, 24) calls that country's 
'situational nationalism': late industrialisation leading to developmentalism where state goals 
'invariably derived from comparisons with external reference economies'. The overwhelming 
goal of the Japanese state has been, and arguably remains, to 'catch up' with the west: to 
accumulate the trappings of state power and thereby gain recognition and prestige within the 
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society and hierarchy of states. In pursuing this goal, the Japanese adopted a strategy of 
techno-nationalism. 
The attraction of nuclear power in such circumstances is manifold. In economic 
terms, nuclear power held out the possibility of freeing Japan from its dependence on 
imported fossil fuels and providing employment and investment in parts of the country 
experiencing economic decline. Politically, the development of a highly complex, resource 
intensive project such as nuclear power fitted perfectly with the goals of techno-nationalism 
and state-led economic development. Strategically, nuclear power was both a necessary evil 
as a consequence of the US-Japan alliance and prudent given its function as a recessed 
deterrent in a hostile, heavily nuclearised regional and global context. Symbolically, nuclear 
power evidenced Japan's post-war economic recovery and technological prowess, and 
fostered within the country a sense of equality - of having 'caught up' - with other leading 
industrial economies. Culturally, nuclear power underpinned narratives of contemporary 
living and of progress into the future: promising to fuel not only the interests of the state but 
also the needs and desires of individual consumers. 
Despite the structural underpinnings, social agency was necessary to put a nuclear 
programme in place. Post-war Japan's 'strong state' played a leading role. This was not, 
however, the strong state envisaged in the standard literature on Japanese politics. It was 
rather a Gramscian 'integral state': one where state and civil society are co-constituted and 
indivisible. This indivisibility, as opposed to elite dominance, is what makes the Japanese 
state 'strong'. Civil society in Japan is not, therefore, as the liberal view would have it, 'weak' 
relative to the state. Civil society is, nevertheless, susceptible to co-option and coercion, just 
as the state is susceptible to pressures exerted upon it by those it purports to serve. Japan’s 
infamous ‘consensus politics’ is the outcome of unending struggle within the ‘integral state’. 
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Armed with this appreciation of Japan as an integral state, we are better able to 
understand both why Japan adopted nuclear power in the first place and how it was made 
possible. Japan adopted nuclear power for the reasons already outlined. This adoption was 
driven by structural imperatives ('late' industrialisation in the context of western imperialism; 
the Cold War) certainly, but it was made possible above all because it was made acceptable 
to ordinary Japanese people by virtue of the skilful use made of channels of communication 
linking political society and civil society. These channels were laid down during the Meiji era 
and either survived into or were re-forged within the post-war period. They continue to 
operate today (Oguma 2016). Japan's hegemonic class also survived, albeit in truncated form. 
Using the aforementioned channels of communication, this hegemonic class was able - over a 
protracted period of time - to persuade large swathes of the populace that commercial nuclear 
power was the choice best suited to meet their individual needs as consumers and their 
collective needs as workers and citizens. Equally important, Japan's hegemonic class was 
able to stifle the cognitive dissonance and political dissent surrounding the country's reliance 
on the weaponised atom: a reliance so clearly redolent of ongoing subjugation and insecurity.   
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